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Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan is confronted with a lot of domestic 
threats and international challenges. Starting with the state-building process 
with much limited institutional capacities and financial resources, the 
leadership of the newly founded Muslim nation developed an extraordinary -
occasionally described as paranoid- security dominated mind-set resulting in 
quite peculiar policies to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity as 
well as to ensure its foreign policy interests. Some of the key features are: the 
continuation of colonial policies (like the Political Agent System/PAS and 
Frontier Crime Regulations/FCR in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas/
FATA), extraordinary repressive policies in areas perceived as restive like 
Balochistan or former East Pakistan (today Bangladesh), or a remarkable 
aggressive foreign policy which finds its expression not only in persistently 
recurring border skirmishes with its Afghan neighbor but also in three wars 
with India (1947, 1965, 1971) and a perfidiously assault at the Indian 
administered Kargil in 1999, just a couple of months after New Delhi started 
a peace process with Islamabad. Subsequently it is not surprises that the 
country’s security analysts and officials are not talking about Afghan or 
Indian border instead they use terms like “Western” or “Eastern front”. 
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The latter one can be described as symptomatic for how Pakistani establishment is thinking 
about is neighbours, which of course is further entrenching threat perceptions and security 
paranoia as crucial determinants in the country’s decision-making process.  
Despite numerous critical junctures, like the fact that Pakistan lost all the war it fought; it 
experienced the separation and independence of its Eastern wing (Bangladesh); it turned into 
the epicentre of international terrorism; and it got more or less totally isolated in the extended 
South Asian region, it does not seem that Pakistan’s leadership is willing to carry out any 
substantial assessment of its interests, goals, and respective policies so far. But since 2013, 
severe, new occurrences emerged: the first transfer of power between two elected (civilian) 
governments after decades of military rule and civilian autocracy; the launch of the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor, heralded as a booster for the country’s flagging economy and 
relations between Beijing and Islamabad; a significant worsening of the internal security 
situation by anti-Pakistan terror groups (for example the Peshawar school massacre); a cooling 
down of US-Pakistan relations, and the subsequent launch of major counter-terrorism 
campaigns.  
By observing these trajectories, several domestic and international analysts were wondering if 
these happenings could initiate a change in the mind-set and policy approaches of Pakistan’s 
elite. But the recently expressed hopes that Pakistan will break with the unfortunate patterns of 
the past and work towards an improvement of the relations with its neighbours and betterment 
of the social, economic and political conditions within its disadvantaged provinces of 
Balochistan, KPK (and FATA) and other areas under its enforced administration like Gilgit-
Baltistan got quickly disappointed. The resilience of Pakistan’s conservative security 
orientated mind-set continues to block any substantially changes in the country politics which 
can be identified especially in following contexts: 
Firstly, terrorism and Pakistan’s threat perception of Afghanistan and India 
Pakistan enhanced tremendously its efforts in fighting terrorism and militancy on its own soil, 
especially after the Peshawar school massacre in 2014. The formulation of the National Action 
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Plan (NAP), the establishment of military courts and the launch of the large-scale military 
operation Zarb-e-Azb are some consequences of the growing public pressure and international 
criticism on the national government and security agents blamed for not tackling adequately 
the challenge of Jihadist militancy. However, it is crucial to recognize that all the military 
actions against the terrorists were mainly directed against terror group fighting Pakistani state 
and society. Militant groups using Pakistan’s territory as base for recruitment and training but 
operating abroad got largely spared. Subsequently one must state, that Pakistan’s conservative 
security circles are continuing the traditional policy of using militant groups carrying out 
cross-border terrorist activities to achieve foreign and security policy goals. By having said 
this, worrying aspects are the worsening security situation in Afghanistan created by pro-
Pakistani terror groups in order to undermine Indian influence and defense cooperation 
between Kabul and New Delhi. The latest major terror attack in Kabul by Taliban as a clear 
response to India’s pledge of increasing support for Afghan army is confirming the current 
high threat perception and volatility in Afghanistan’s internal security scenario. In sum, there 
is a clear contradiction between Pakistan’s official rhetoric in joining the “global war on 
terror” and its ongoing sponsorship of terror groups operating in Afghanistan and India. As 
such, there was never a new strategy or intension by Pakistan in fighting international 
terrorism outside its own borders. 
Secondly, the latest deterioration of US-Pakistan ties 
Up and downs are nothing new in the US-Pakistan relations. However, this time the cooling 
down is accompanied with a tremendous intensification of Pakistan-China ties. These were 
always on a relatively good track but since 2014 with the start of the establishment of the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the bilateral relations were not only broadening 
but much deepening too. Ranging from massive CPEC related investments, including more 
than $ 50 billion, to an enhanced security & defence cooperation, there are increasing 
domestic and international voices warning that Pakistan might transform into a ‘Chinese 
satellite’ state. In this context, one should be also aware that there is a remarkable asymmetry 
in the perception of each other: The majority of Pakistan’s people see China in an 
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extraordinary positive light. However, the common Chinese people who identify Pakistan as 
the epicentre of terrorism, militancy, regional insurgencies, religious radicalisation and 
political violence do not reflect such high esteem. In other words, Pakistan is hosting all 
unfortunate phenomena, which the central government in Beijing describes as the three major 
evils: "terrorism, separatism and religious extremism". Nevertheless, the numerous large 
common interests will without doubt bridge the imbalance in sympathies and function as a 
common bond in Sino-Pak relations. Against this backdrop one can state that due to the 
massive Chinese investments, Pakistan is not only able to diversify its foreign aid but also to 
gain more independence from US financial support. This is gaining significance in case of an 
increase of China-US tensions in the South China Sea as well as India-China rivalry in the 
Indian Ocean. The fact that there is a new rapprochement between Washington and New 
Delhi, will not only create more suspicion and hostilities in Pakistan-India relations but will 
also lead to a further alienation in military-to-military ties which was until now the guarantor 
of basic stability in US-Pakistan relations. In consequence, one should expect a further 
deepening of the relations between Pakistan and China, moving the South Asian country even 
more out of the orbit of US influence. Against this backdrop, the cooling of US-Pakistan 
relations might encourage Pakistan to continue using not only proxy forces in Afghanistan but 
also in Indian administered Kashmir as well as in the Indian Punjab. The terror attacks in 
Pathankot and in Gurdaspur (both in Punjab) by Pakistani based terror groups’ emphasises the 
willingness of Pakistan to destabilise its neighbours - perceived as hostile - and increase their 
costs for maintaining security and law and order. Until recently Washington was able to 
function as a ‘guardian’ over Pakistan’s support for cross-border activities and on numerous 
occasions the US successfully convinced the country’s powerful military and intelligence 
service ISI to contain -at least temporarily- its cooperation with terror groups. However, the 
fact that two of the most wanted terrorists world-wide, Osama-bin Laden (Al Qaeda) and 
Mullah Omar (Taliban) were living quite comfortably under the eyes of Pakistan’ security 
agents amplifies Pakistan’s ‘double game’ and ambiguity in fighting against terrorism. In this 
context, one should mention that China remains relatively silent as long as neither Chinese 
interests, nor a Chinese citizen are endangered. Furthermore, Beijing offered on numerous 
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occasions diplomatic support by blocking international, UN sanctions against Pakistan based 
terrorists. 
In sum, taking above mentioned developments into account, one must state that despite the 
tremendous international developments and the increasing challenges, Pakistan’s elite is not 
willing to carry out any fundamental change, neither in its domestic, nor in its foreign policy 
parameters.  
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